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Abstract 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) exploit natural resources, whether renewable as in the case of forests, 
fisheries and agricultural products or non-renewable as in the case of minerals or petroleum, in developing 
countries through their subsidiaries. TNCs’ exploitation of forests and acquisition of intellectual property rights 
in plants and animal breeding, based on the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples developed over 
millennia, are in conflict with the rights of indigenous peoples to their territories, resources and traditional 
knowledge. TNCs also profit from conflict by trading natural resources that prolong wars; colluding with 
repressive governments to pervert political processes within a State; aiding and abetting crimes against humanity; 
and flagrantly violating human rights. This article explores the areas of conflict outlined above and examines the 
efficacy of the mechanisms for the control of TNCs whether legally binding or not. It is suggested that the only 
effective way of making TNCs accountable for their human rights violations and aiding and abetting crimes 
against humanity is the establishment of an international court with jurisdiction over corporations. 
Keywords: transnational corporations, natural resources, conflict, corporate social responsibility, international 
law 
1. Introduction 
The history of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) is the history of exploitation of natural resources in 
developing countries and conflict and the failure to make TNCs accountable for collusion with repressive 
governments to pervert political processes within a State, egregious breaches of human rights and aiding and 
abetting crimes against humanity. 
TNCs, that is, corporations whether incorporated or state-owned, which own or control production or service 
facilities outside the country in which they are based are not recent post-World War II creation as some theorists 
suggest (Vagts, 1970). The first TNC was the Dutch East India Company (or Vereenidge Oost-Indiche Companie 
(VOC)) founded in 1602. The company was responsible for the Batavia Massacre of 1740 during the Chinese 
uprising over prices of sugar. In 1798, the company, weakened by internal deficiencies in the face of its 
competitors, notable among which was the British East India Company, was dissolved (Kelly, 2018). 
The quest for natural resources by European powers in order to benefit the home countries led to widespread 
colonial activity during the Age of Discovery or the Age of Exploration (early 15th century to early 17th century) 
and after. For each possession acquired there was a corporation established as an instrument of annexation such 
as the British East India Company (the largest), Hudson Bay Company and the National African Company 
founded in 1879, to mention a few. In 1886 the National African Company was granted a Royal Charter under 
the name of Royal Niger Company, Chartered and Limited, which authorised the Company to administer the 
district obtained by cession and to exercise sovereign rights over the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria but with 
the proviso that “[t]he Company shall always be and remain British in character and domicile; and shall have its 
principal office in England … and all Directors shall be natural born British” (Cook, 1964; Elias, 1967). It is 
worthy of note that limited liability was introduced by the Limited Liability Act 1855 and TNCs’ accountability 
for their wrongs is based on the concept of corporate personality – that a corporation is a legal persona (a legal 
personality) distinct from the personalities of persons who constitute it – enunciated in 1897 in the decision of 
the House of Lords in the United Kingdom in Salomon v Salomon & Co (Note 1). On 1 January 1900, the 
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British Government took over the entire territory of the Royal Niger Company, Chartered and Limited; thus 
annexing Northern Nigeria. 
The quest for natural resources for the benefit of the home State, a hangover from the Age of Discovery, alluded 
to above, is one aspect of the exploitation of natural resources by TNCs in developing countries; the other aspect 
is neoliberalism. In the 1970s and 1980s, neoliberalism was constructed by democratic means in some countries 
and, in others, in the case of Chile, brute force and repression of all solidarity within labour and social 
movements. The principles espoused by neoliberals are liberalisation of the market and finance, deregulation, 
macroeconomic stability (end inflation), privatisation, and the withdrawal of the State from many areas of social 
provision, and the destruction of all forms of social solidarity such as trade unions. The propagation of 
neoliberalism worldwide is the result of powerful governments, especially the United States, the creation of the 
World Trade Organization in the 1990s and through the operations of the IMF, the World Bank and TNCs 
(Chomsky, 1999; Harvey, 2011). 
TNCs exploit natural resources, whether renewable as in the case of forests, fisheries and agricultural products or 
non-renewable as in the case of minerals or petroleum. Where neoliberal states in developing countries take the 
side of TNCs, conflict is inevitable. TNCs’ exploitation of forests and acquisition of intellectual property rights 
in plant and animal breeding, based on the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples developed over 
millennia, are in conflict with the rights of indigenous peoples to their territories, biogenetic resources and 
traditional knowledge. TNCs profit from conflict by trading natural resources that prolong wars, collude with 
repressive governments to pervert political processes within a State, and are responsible for egregious violations 
of human rights and aiding and abetting crimes against humanity. Legal and social theorists have analysed TNCs 
and their exploitation of natural resources in developing countries. The point, however, in this article is to show 
that the only effective way of making TNCs accountable for their human rights violations and aiding and 
abetting crimes against humanity is the establishment of an international court with jurisdiction over 
corporations. 
In this article, the themes to be discussed are as follows: 
(i) Transnational Corporations in Conflict Regions: neoliberalism versus resource sovereignty or autochthony; 
(ii) The impact of Transnational Corporations on indigenous peoples; 
(iii) A critical analysis of corporate social responsibility; 
(iv) The (in)efficacy of mechanisms for regulating Transnational Corporations; and 
(v) Conclusions: the desirability and feasibility of an international court with jurisdiction over corporations. 
But first, TNCs in conflict regions are critically assessed in a lexical order. 
2. TNCs in Conflict Regions: Neoliberalism versus Resource Sovereignty or Autochthony 
It is estimated that there are almost 60,000 TNCs worldwide in over 70 conflict regions (Bais and Huijser, 2005). 
Although TNCs are prohibited from engaging directly or indirectly in violations of jus cogens principles such as 
the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, genocide, torture, extrajudicial murders and crimes against humanity, 
globalisation has given them unprecedented economic, political and environmental power – compendiously 
described as “market power” – to influence illegitimately the political process within a State, undermine 
democracy, aid and abet crimes against humanity and flagrantly violate human rights. 
While the atrocities committed by TNCs in their exploitation of non-renewable resources (minerals or petroleum) 
are egregious, the wrongs committed in the exploitation of renewable resources (forests, fisheries and 
agricultural products) are civil, not criminal, wrongs and will be discussed later; but first, the exploitation of 
minerals is critically assessed. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) classified 
the extractive industry into three main categories: (i) energy minerals (oil, gas, coal and uranium); (ii) metallic 
minerals (ferrous metals, precious metals and base metals); and (iii) non-metallic minerals (construction minerals, 
industrial minerals and precious stones) (UNCTAD, 2008). These categories are sub-divided and are rather 
cumbersome for the analysis of TNCs’ exploitation of minerals in conflict regions. To facilitate exposition, 
non-renewable minerals in conflict regions are classified as (i) blood diamonds, (ii) conflict minerals or “3Ts + G” 
(tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold), (iii) petroleum, and (iv) others. There are, however, two points of conflict 
between TNCs and developing countries to be discussed. The first is the introduction of neoliberal programmes 
in developing countries and the second is that TNCs profit in trading in natural resources that prolong wars. 
2.1 Neoliberalism versus Resource Sovereignty or Autochthony 
Conflicts over the extraction of minerals are shaped by two opposing principles: (i) neoliberalism, and (ii) 
ilr.ccsenet.org International Law Research Vol. 9, No. 1; 2020 
58 
 
resource sovereignty or autochthony (Note 2). Neoliberalism – free trade and privatisation – is foisted on 
developing countries by powerful governments making false promises of local economic development. This 
often leads to the handover of the developing country’s natural resources to TNCs. The opposing principle is 
resource sovereignty or autochthony: the right of the people to natural resources situated in their territories and to 
adopt economic and political systems that are autochthonous, that is, home-grown or home-bred or indigenous to 
their soil. When these two principles collide, conflict is inevitable. To illustrate this collision, four case studies 
will suffice. 
The first is Chile. When Salvador Allende lost the presidency to Eduardo Frei in 1964, before Chile embraced 
neoliberalism, there was a national consensus that the copper industry should be subjected to some form of state 
ownership or control. Copper was of strategic importance to Chile because of the foreign exchange earnings and 
was also a strategic input for TNCs because it was basic to their system of producing and capital accumulation. 
The demand for copper arose out of the growth of electric power industry in the United States. The Chilenization 
of copper inevitably became a conflict between Allende’s Chile and American capitalism and the imperialist 
intervention on behalf of the TNCs ‘expropriated’ led to the bloody overthrow and killing of Allende, a 
democratically elected President. A few weeks after Allende’s demise the Chilean subsidiaries of TNCs 
‘expropriated’ were ready to resume their exploitation of copper in Chile (Girvan, 1976). 
The second is Bolivia. The Bolivia Guera del Gas or the Gas War of 2003 – a discontent with neoliberalism – 
had been brewing since the introduction of neoliberalism in Bolivia in the mid-1980s. The proximate cause of 
the war was the formation of Pacific LNG: a consortium involving Repsol YPF, British Gas and Pan-American 
Energy formed in Paris in 2002. The Bolivian Government in collaboration with the consortium planned to 
transport natural gas from its Margarita gas field via a pipeline to a plant in the Chilean coast and to be 
transformed into liquefied gas (LNG) and shipped to the United States and Mexico. (Bolivia is landlocked 
because it lost its coastal region to Chile in the War of Pacific in the 1870s.) What began as calls to export gas 
through a Peruvian port rather than a Chilean port became a violent protest which led to the death of seventy 
Bolivians and President Ganzalo Sánchez resigning and fleeing to the United States (Sawyer and Gomez, 2012). 
The third is the Philippines. The Philippines rank globally second in gold, third in copper, fifth in nickel and six 
in chromite. How does it exercise its resource sovereignty or autochthony? The Mining Act 1985 gives the 
government the right to grant mining rights to individuals and corporations. Pursuant to this Act, local 
corporations and TNCs are given rights to use water and forest resources without permission from the 
indigenous peoples. The TNCs are even allowed to repatriate 100% of their profits. This was challenged in court 
by a tribal association on the grounds that it violated Article XII of the Philippine Constitution of 1987 which 
stipulated that the State may enter into a joint venture or production sharing agreement with Filipino citizens or 
corporations or associations at least 60 per cent of whose capital is owned by such citizens, corporations or 
associations and that the agreement to repatriate 100 per cent profit was therefore unconstitutional, null and void, 
and of no effect whatsoever. The Supreme Court of the Philippines deferred to the neoliberal state and TNCs, 
favouring 100 per cent of foreign ownership instead of 40 per cent share (Sawyer and Gomez, 2012). 
The fourth is the proposal to exploit coal by AEC, a British mining company in Phulbari, a densely populated 
agricultural area of Bangladesh, by building a coal mine if it received government approval. The local 
community and transnational activists resisted on two grounds: (i) that the open mine would destroy the 
agricultural land and underground water resources; and (ii) that the narratives assuming the benefits to the 
community were unconvincing. The coal mine project was cancelled (Faruque, 2018). 
2.2 Blood Diamonds and Conflict Minerals 
The history of “blood diamond” and “conflict minerals” is inextricably intertwined with civil wars in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone in West Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in Central Africa. Liberia played 
a vital role in the outbreak of civil war in Sierra Leone and under Charles Taylor’s leadership, Liberia became a 
pariah state due to his use of blood diamonds to fund the civil war in Sierra Leone, a country which relies on the 
mining of diamond for its economic base. ABN Amro (the fourteenth on the world list of diamond banks) did not 
invest in Sierra Leone but granted loans to diamond traders some of whom buy their raw materials from the 
Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone led by Foday Sankoh who in turn used the proceeds of sale to buy 
new loads of Kalashnikovs. Congo is perhaps the richest African country in mineral wealth. 80 per cent of the 
reserves of coltan, which is a major source of tantalum used as a high-charge conductor for mobile phones, 
digital games, microprocessors and associated products, lie in the eastern region of Congo. This country is also 
home to a considerable proportion of minerals such as gold, diamonds, uranium, copper, tin which is processed 
from cassiterite and tungsten which is used to construct lightbulbs, laptop screens and make cell phones vibrate 
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( Smith,2011). 
In 1960, at the time of the constitutional crisis in Congo, Société Générale de Belgique (SGB), a TNC, owned 
Union Minère de Haute Katanga (UMHK), its subsidiary, which owned or controlled most of the non-renewable 
natural resources in the Congo. As a matter of fact, SGB’s operation accounted for 70 per cent of the Congolese 
economy. Pursuant to resource sovereignty or autochthony, Joseph Mobutu declared ‘economic independence’ in 
1966 and expropriated the assets of UMHK which was later renamed Celamines (McKern, 1993). The aversion 
of the Western powers to communism influenced their support for Mobutu who, before he was driven out of 
Congo by Laurent Dèsirè Kabila and his allies, plundered the Treasury of Congo by asserting what is known as 
“resource privilege” (Pogge, 2013). The war to overthrow Mobutu was the first recent civil war fought in Congo 
between 1996 and 1997. The second civil war started in 1998 by erstwhile allies of Kabila with a view to taking 
over the natural resources of the country. During the hostilities, warlords and militias used forced labour to 
extract both diamonds and conflict minerals which were bought by high-level middlemen (comptoirs or 
accountants) who sold them to Belgians, South Africans, Rwandans and other foreigners who in turn sold them 
to buyers in the United States, Japan and Europe; and TNCs have negotiated directly with ruthless militias and 
warlords who forced people to mine diamonds and conflict minerals, plundered villages and used rape as an 
instrument of war (Mantz, 2008; Smith, 2011). 
The link between diamonds and war was first recognised by the United Nations Resolution 1173 of June 1998 
(Note 2). Since then, the persistent question has been whether the illegal exploitation of diamonds and conflict 
minerals can be stopped; and, if so, whether the mechanisms adopted are efficacious or not. The mechanisms are 
discussed later but it is pertinent to note that the obstacles to a lasting solution are the artisanal or small diamond 
and “3Ts + G” miners and the voluntary private-public cooperation – the logic of the Kimberley process 
(discussed later) which cannot be used in the DRC because of weak internal controls (Turner, 2013). DRC is not 
the only diamond producer in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The marketing of diamonds in Angola is also 
problematic. In Angola, all rights to Angolan diamonds were granted to ASCorp – a joint venture between the 
state diamond company, SODIAM, Willcox of Israel and Tars of Belgium – financed by Lev Levi, an 
Israeli-Russian businessman and the biggest buyer on the diamond market outside De Beers, a TNC founded in 
South Africa with its marketing arm, the Diamond Trading Company, resident in London, in the United 
Kingdom. 
Angola signed a structural agreement in March 2000 with Belgium’s Diamond High Council which operates on 
behalf of the diamond industry and Belgian Ministry of Economic Affairs to ensure that its diamonds are ‘clean’. 
However, the Angolan market is divided into three sectors: (i) the formal market which consists of diamonds 
officially licensed by ASCorp; (ii) the informal market which consists of diamonds mined “freelance” and sold 
to buyers licensed by ASCorp; and (iii) the illicit sector mined by unlicensed diggers and buyers (Tamm, 2002). 
It is therefore safe to assert that there is a rebuttable presumption that “blood diamonds” and “conflict minerals” 
are still being traded and TNCs profit from trading in these resources which prolong wars and are complicit in 
the heinous crimes perpetrated by warlords and militias in the conflict region. 
2.3 Transnational (Oil) Corporations’ Violations of Human Rights 
The petroleum or oil industry is an oligopoly dominated by a few large sellers. The eleven major oil TNCs (with 
their states of origin and revenue in 2018) are as follows: 
1) China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (also known as Sinopec) (China, $426bn); 
2) Royal Dutch Shell (the UK and the Netherlands, $388.37bn); 
3) Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia, $355.9bn); 
4) China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (China, $346bn); 
5) BP plc (the UK, $298.7bn); 
6) Exxon Mobil (the US, $290.3bn); 
7) Total (France, $209.3bn); 
8) Chevron (the US, $158.9bn); 
9) Lukoil (Russia, $115.2bn); 
10) Rosneft (Russia, $113.7bn); and 
11) Phillips 66 Company (the US, $111.4bn) (Note 3). 
The other three Western juniors are Talisman Oil (Canada), Lundin Oil (Sweden) and OMV (Austria). 
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The eleven major oil TNCs are richer than the developing countries in whose territories they operate. Their 
“market power” is an important factor in the critical assessment of their accountability for violations of human 
rights. The other factor is that the offender (the TNC) is not a natural person but a ‘legal person’ and the victim is 
the community in the particular zone of conflict the TNC operates. Three Ogoniland cases are worthy of note. 
The first case is Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (Note 4). In this case, the plaintiffs who were 
members of the Ogoniland tribe of Nigeria sued under the Alien Tort Claims Act 1789 in the Southern District of 
New York Royal Dutch Shell Company (Shell) for their involvement in the arrest, torture and execution of Mr. 
Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni elders who protested against the widespread environmental damage caused by 
oil and gas extraction and transport. The case was dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds (that an 
appropriate competent court may divest itself of jurisdiction if it appears that the action should proceed in 
another forum) and was settled out of court. 
The second case is The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria (Ogoniland case) (Note 
5). Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 provides peoples with a right to “a 
good satisfactory environment favourable to their development”. In SERAC v Nigeria, the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights held, inter alia, that Article 24 of the African Charter imposes an obligation on 
the State to take reasonable steps “to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and 
to secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources”. In this case, the Ogoni people 
alleged that the Nigerian government directly participated in unsustainable oil development practices in 
Ogoniland in that the state-owned oil company had caused environmental degradation which included 
widespread contamination of soil, water and air, destruction of houses, burning of crops and killing of farm 
animals. The African Commission on Human Rights (an organ of the African Union) found that although Nigeria 
had the right to make use of a natural resource, Nigeria had breached its human rights obligation to Ogoniland 
because the level of pollution and human degradation was humanly unacceptable and made living in Ogoniland a 
nightmare. 
The third, and relatively recent case, is Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (2013) (Note 6). In this case, 
the petitioners, former residents of Ogoniland, Nigeria, brought suit in the US District Court for the Southern 
District of New York against the respondents, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and their subsidiary, Shell 
Petroleum Development Nigeria Ltd (SPDC). The petitioners alleged that the residents of Ogoniland had begun 
protesting the environmental effects of SPDC when Royal Dutch Petroleum recruited the Nigerian Government 
who, through its agents, crushed the demonstration by looting property and carrying out acts of violence such as 
rape, murder and forced exile which are crimes against humanity; and that the respondents aided and abetted 
those crimes. The petitioners alleged jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act instantiated above and 
requested relief under international law. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided that international law does 
not recognise corporate liability and dismissed the case. Although on appeal the US Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, the Court held that the acts which violated international law occurred outside the United States and 
the petitioners’ suit was barred. 
The three Ogoniland cases discussed above show clearly the legal and political hurdles to be surmounted in 
foreign courts where violations of human rights are brought against TNCs. The Ogoni people could not sue Shell 
in Nigeria because of the doctrines of act of state and state immunity (Note 7). A strong case will be made in the 
concluding remarks for the creation of an international court with jurisdiction over corporations in the interests 
of restorative or reparative justice. 
3. The Impact of TNCs on Indigenous Peoples 
Renewable natural resources are forests, fisheries and agricultural products. Forests are integral to the lives of 
indigenous peoples and are situated in their territories. They are the sources of softwood, mixed wood and 
hardwood; and joint ventures between TNCs and indigenous peoples such as Bloedel MacMillan and 
Weyerhauser in Canada have been successful (Sawyer and Gomez, 2012). However, unsustainable felling of 
timber by TNCs in the territories of indigenous peoples, especially in the rainforests, has contributed 
significantly to climate change, a global problem facing humankind that will not go away in a hurry (Salako, 
2017). The other problems facing humankind are scarce resources, world hunger and the eradication of diseases. 
These problems could be solved by agrobiotechnology which is defined as “the application of new and 
promising scientific processes and techniques in the field of biotechnology to crop germplasm and novel use of 
plants, animals and microorganisms for the improvement of crops and livestock in terms of yield and quantity” 
(Francioni and Scovazi, 2006). 
The feeding of the world population, expected to be 10 billion in 2050, by current extrapolation (Note 8), could 
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be achieved by genetically engineered crops which ripen faster, mature quickly and last longer; and by 
hybridisation which introduces a plant breeding technique that is capable of providing more productive varieties 
and eliminating the possibility of saving or replanting seeds. Hybridisation leads to the commodification of 
germplasm which contains information which is the result of millennia of breeding and improvement by 
indigenous peoples based on traditional knowledge, that is, “all indigenous knowledge of the ecosystems 
historically and/or presently surrounding the indigenous people” including the three categories of folklore: (i) 
artistic folklore (marks of visual or performing arts); (ii) physical folklore (traditional knowledge of flora and 
fauna, medical knowledge and techniques of preparing natural substances); and (iii) spiritual folklore 
(indigenous religions, superstitions and customary laws)” (Koning, 1998). 
With hybridisation came the commodification of germplasm and the germplasm which contained information 
from indigenous peoples became the property of agrobiotechnology TNCs, notable among which are Schering 
AgrEvo GmbH (or AgrEvo), Monsanto, Pfizer, Pioneer Hi-Breed and Zeneca. In return for their research on 
exploiting specific genetic characteristics, these TNCs perceived the acquisition of intellectual property rights in 
plant genetic resources as the only way of recouping the money spent on research and development. The 
problem is that agrobiotechnology and intellectual property rights are in conflict with the rights of indigenous 
peoples to their territories, resources, traditional knowledge and culture. The pertinent question is: what is the 
status of traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples under the existing international intellectual property law? 
The preamble to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) recognises the traditional knowledge, innovation 
and practices of indigenous peoples as relevant to the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use 
of its components (Note 9). Article 3 of the CBD contains an explicit reference to the principle of sovereign 
rights of indigenous peoples over their natural resources, and the importance of indigenous peoples for in situ 
conservation is recognised by Article 8(j) of the CBD which requires State Parties to respect and preserve 
innovation and practices of indigenous peoples relevant to conservation. Article 15 of the CBD authorises States 
to limit or place conditions on access to genetic resources, but this Article is subject to the discipline of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) (Note 10). Although there was a 
consensus in the World Intellectual Property Organisation and TRIPS Council that TRIPS which was negotiated 
contemporaneously but in different fora with CBD should contain provisions for the protection of traditional 
knowledge, culture and folklore, it seems TRIPS passed this over in silence (Cottier, 1998). In view of the 
provisions of the international instruments instantiated above, how do we reconcile the intellectual property 
system with the indigenous biogenetic resources and traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples? 
There are two options but both are problematic. The first option, the use of the mechanism of intellectual 
property protection, is fraught with difficulties. The problem with intellectual property rights is the fixation 
requirement. Inasmuch as traditional knowledge and folklore (as defined above) are unwritten and exist for 
centuries before they are abandoned or forgotten, the traditional intellectual property categories – copyright and 
patent – are limited in time and unsuitable for protecting indigenous biogenetic resources and related traditional 
knowledge. The second option is the sharing of benefits from the TNCs’ exploitation of indigenous biogenetic 
resources and related knowledge with the indigenous peoples. This is inappropriate because of the principled and 
empirical objections. The principled objection is that not all indigenous peoples are willing to commodify their 
biogenetic resources and traditional knowledge and the empirical objection is that it is difficult to obtain 
informed consent from indigenous peoples. We are left with a third option – protection rooted in human rights – 
which will be discussed below under the (in)efficacy of the mechanisms for regulating TNCs. 
4. A Critical Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility 
The idea of corporate social responsibility evolved from a niche interest of environmentalists and from 
international human rights organisations to cut off the funding of armed groups in conflict areas and reduce the 
suffering of the civilian population with particular reference to Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan (Note 
11). In the case of Sudan, Talisman Energy Inc (Canada) was persuaded by the Canadian government to sell its 
shares in an international consortium providing income for the Arab-Islamic government and prolonging the war 
against the Christians and the animists in South Sudan. 
On the one hand, TNCs in the European Union in particular are interested in sourcing their minerals in a socially 
responsible way; on the other hand, some TNCs are averse to any form of internal rules that will make them 
accountable for their wrongs. Other TNCs, while accepting that some international legal standards should apply 
to them, opine that international law should not be transferred wholesale to them and would rather prefer 
international legal standards to serve as guide posts for corporate behaviour. 
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What then is corporate social responsibility? The term “corporate social responsibility” is the notion that good 
behaviour is good business. The term is a compendious term for concepts such as “business ethics”, “corporate 
accountability”, “corporate citizenship” and “corporate sustainability” (Mares, 2018). The word “sustainability” 
used in the last mentioned concept was coined in the Brundtland Report which characterised as “sustainable” any 
development that “meets the need of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 2005). “Corporate accountability” can be achieved through 
criminal legislation, transparency legislation and voluntary regulation by TNCs. 
There are two aspects of corporate social responsibility: the political and the classical (Scherer and Palazzo, 
2007). The conventional wisdom is that the role of businesses and, a fortiori, TNCs is to maximise their profits 
but there is a political perspective to businesses. Historically, TNCs have engaged in politics by exercising 
sovereign rights at the behest of States as in the case of the East India Company (VOC) and the Royal Niger 
Company, Chartered and Limited discussed in the Introduction; and they still collude with or aid and abet States 
as in the case of Royal Dutch Petroleum (Shell) and exploit non-renewable natural resources in neoliberal 
(developing) countries. The problem with economic actors engaging in politics is one of legitimacy: they are 
neither elected nor democratically controlled. The other aspect is the classical aspect: how do we make them 
accountable? Put differently, what is our conception of justice? Is it based on liberalism or cosmopolitanism or 
communitarianism? 
4.1 Liberalism, Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism 
Sustainability or meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs raises questions of distributive justice. One conception of justice is the “common ownership of 
the earth” or the “common heritage principle” attributable to the seventeenth century philosophers such as Hugo 
Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke and others who regard the earth as the common heritage of humankind. 
The view that God had given the earth to humankind is applied to the high seas, the ocean floor, Antarctica and 
outer space (Malanczuk, 1997; Trindade, 2010). But the quest for natural resources by European powers to 
benefit the home countries brought into focus philosophical issues which the European powers had to address. 
Beginning in the 1970s, two liberal philosophers, Rawls and Nozick, who were social contractarians reflected on 
how the emergence of a post-Westphalian world has modified the moral responsibilities of governments, 
corporations and individuals. John Rawls in A Theory of Justice argues that justice as fairness can only be 
derived from the original position: a position of equality which corresponds to the traditional theory of social 
contract (Rawls, 1999a). In the original position, two principles of justice as fairness are proffered: (i) each 
person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal liberties compatible with a similar scheme for all, 
and (ii) those who are disadvantaged or worse off are to be compensated (the difference principle) (Rawls, 1993 
and 1999a). Rawls in The Law of Peoples uses the idea of “the original position” a second time with the parties 
now understood to be representatives of peoples to show how a World Society of liberal and non-liberal (but 
decent) peoples might be possible (Rawls, 1999b). In The Law of Peoples Rawls refused to extend “the 
difference principle” to a World Society of liberal and non-liberal (but decent) peoples because a world 
government to enforce such principle at the international level is not feasible. For Rawls, a world government 
would either be “a global despotism” or “a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as various regions and 
peoples tried to gain political freedom and autonomy” (Note 12). 
Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia condemns Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness as anti-meritocratic 
and provides a philosophical justification of neoliberalism. Nozick argues that individuals have rights and there 
are things no person may do to them (without violating those rights) (Note 13). Relying on Locke that a person 
acquires property when he mixes his labour with soil provided he leaves sufficient for others (the Lockean 
proviso), he propounds the entitlement theory of distributive justice. According to this theory, once a person’s [or 
a TNC’s] acquisition of property satisfies the three principles of just acquisition, transfer and rectification even 
the State has no right over it under its power of redistribution. For Nozick, only a minimal state can be justified. 
Any State more extensive violates people’s rights (Nozick, 1974). 
Cosmopolitanism whether political, which advocates the elimination or transformation of state borders, or ethical 
– which advocates what might be called a global sphere of moral standing – invokes the phrase “citizens of the 
world” to show that we must have equal moral standing. Cosmopolitanism is also divided into cosmopolitan 
liberalism (that the principles of distributive justice are acceptable when a person’s prospects rather than the 
prospects of each society are taken into account), and cosmopolitan republicanism which emphasises the 
exercise of citizen sovereignty as a check to new forms of global authority not subject to democratic 
accountability. 
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Embracing the insights in Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness (outlined above) and transcending them, 
cosmopolitan liberals such as Beitz, Pogge and Buchanan argue that for the same reasons that parties agree to the 
difference principle in domestic society, the global principle should be the difference principle. For Pogge and 
Buchanan, the global basic structure comprises regional and international agreements such as GATT, WTO and 
various guiding principles, codes, norms, treaties and declarations which govern corporate social responsibility 
(Beitz, 1979/1999; Buchanan, 2000; Pogge, 2001a; and Pogge, 2001b). 
Communitarians challenge the cosmopolitan liberals’ emphasis on individual autonomy for closing of 
considerations of value that individuals and, a fortiori, indigenous peoples find in their culture, communal 
practices and traditions. Alasdir MacIntyre in After Virtue contends: “It is not just that different individuals live 
in different social circumstances; it is also that we all approach our circumstances as bearers of a particular social 
identity” (MacIntyre, 1981). In a similar vein, Charles Taylor, another communitarian opines that “since the free 
individual can only maintain his identity within a society/culture of a certain kind, he has to be concerned about 
the shape of his society/culture as a whole” (Taylor, 2001). While the state borders have only instrumental value 
from a cosmopolitan standpoint, they are morally defining from a communitarian standpoint (Hill, 2000). 
Cosmopolitan republicanism, in the context of “crimes against humanity” with its focus on political tyranny, 
provides the conceptual tool for using the international political community as the addressee of human rights 
rather than States (Bohman, 2001 and 2004). A republican right claim has these three components: (i) the claim 
must be legitimate, (ii) the claim requires standing, that is, recognition as a person to make such claim, and (iii) 
the addressee, that is, the community in which one has status. The establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), discussed below, constitutes this political community as an addressee of such right claim in which 
individuals have legal status of citizens of the world. The problem, however, is that the ICC lacks jurisdiction 
over TNCs as juridical corporate entities. There is a plethora of internationally recognised frameworks and 
principles guiding corporate social responsibility and these will be discussed under three headings: (i) principles, 
declarations and guidelines, (ii) transparency laws, and (iii) self or voluntary regulation. 
4.2 Principles, Declarations and Guidelines 
The duty to promote and protect human rights in the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948 applies to “every organ of society” which includes TNCs (Note 14). The term “treaty” includes any 
international agreement in written form whatever its particular designation (treaty, convention, protocol, act, 
covenant, charter, declaration, concordat and memorandum of agreement) concluded by two or more states or 
other subjects of international law (Note 15). While the use of the appellation “treaty”, “convention” or “charter” 
means that the instrument is binding, there are controversial candidatures such as declarations, agreements, 
guidelines and initiatives which may or may not be binding. Four of such instruments are worthy of note: (i) the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD, 2011); (ii) the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (OECD, 2004); (iii) the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Note 
16 ); and (iv) the International Labour Organisation: Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (Note 17). 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (hereinafter referred to as ‘Guidelines’) is unique among corporate social responsibility tools in its 
comprehensive nature. The Guidelines are recommendations which are non-binding principles and standards 
addressed by governments to TNCs operating in or from adhering countries.The Guidelines address all aspects 
of taxation, consumer interests, competition, science, technology, human rights and corporate behaviour. The 
recommendations on corporate behaviour include obeying domestic laws as the first obligation of enterprises; 
contributing to economic, environmental and social progress with a view to achieving sustainable development; 
and adhering to the good corporate practice promulgated by the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Principles’) (Note 18). Again, the Principles are not binding and are not aimed at 
detailed prescription for national legislation. They are evolutionary in nature: to be reviewed to meet the 
demands of a changing world and include the promotion of transparent and efficient markets which are 
consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulated division of responsibilities among different regulatory and 
supervisory authorities (Note 19). 
The United Nations General Principles on Business and Human Rights stated corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights as one of its foundational principles and in order to meet this responsibility businesses should have 
in place policies and processes appropriate to their size and circumstances, and where businesses have 
contributed to adverse impacts, they should make amends through legitimate processes (Note 20). 
The ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE 
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Declaration) offers guidelines on TNCs, governments and employers’ and workers’ organisations in areas of 
employment, conditions of work and life and industrial relations. The MNE Declaration, approved by the 
Governing Body of the International Labour Office at its 204th Session in November 1977, has been amended 
recently to take account of the Paris Agreement 2015 concerning climate change and the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (as revised in 2011) (Note 10). The MNE Declaration enjoins all parties to the 
instrument to respect the sovereign rights of States, to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
and its two offshoots, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (section 8); to take effective measures to prevent and 
eliminate forced labour (section 23); and to develop a national policy to ensure the effective abolition of child 
labour (section 26). The principles, policies and standards promulgated in the MNE Declaration are exhortatory 
and aspirational (and not binding). 
4.3 Transparency Laws 
The purpose of transparency laws is two-fold, namely, to cut off the funding of armed groups in conflict areas to 
reduce the sufferings of the civilian population caused by human rights violations and to provide the least 
invasive method of shaping corporate behaviour. The Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme (KPCS) 2003 is the 
earliest effort to increase transparency in the chain of supply of minerals sourced by TNCs from conflict areas 
(Note 21). The KPCS focuses on “blood diamonds”, and not the “3T + G” conflict minerals, and creates a 
certification process to accompany each exported shipment of rough diamonds. Although trade in rough 
diamonds is certified, certification is inapt for dealing with “resource curse” (the little economic growth 
generated in most developing countries with great natural wealth), and “resource privilege”, that is, the power of 
de facto rulers of mineral-rich countries to effect legally valid transfers of ownership rights of their resources 
(Pogge, 2013). There are also problems with artisanal mining, discussed later, which is not within the purview of 
KPCS. 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 2003 goes beyond “blood diamonds” and promulgates 
global principles of transparency in oil, gas and mining. The EITI enunciates principles that describe how 
companies and governments can promote transparency and exhort companies to publish what they pay in taxes 
to mineral-rich governments; and the governments in turn to publish what they receive (Note 22). The problem 
with EITI, which is underpinned by the international rule of law, is that in international law sovereignty remains 
with States existing in a horizontal plane of sovereign equality and governments are not ready for the surrender 
of their sovereignty (Bishop, 1960–1961; Chesterman, 2008). 
Two developments on both sides of the Atlantic are worthy of consideration. The disclosure laws enacted since 
2010 are “name and shame” laws requiring TNCs to be transparent about their decision-making processes but 
not their conduct resulting in human rights violations. Two pieces of legislation – the California Supply Claims 
Act 2010 (the US) and the Slavery Act 2015 (the UK) require TNCs to disclose the presence of slavery and 
human trafficking in their supply chain and their efforts to eradicate them. The US Responsible Investment 
Burma Law 2012 was enacted to address the effects of new investment on the political transition in Myanmar 
(Burma) (Note 23). The Law required companies to report on eleven points including human rights policies and 
procedures, risk prevention and mitigation measures. This Law was in force from 2013 to 2016. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act) (Note 24) 
enacted in the US must be read conjunctively with its counterpart – the EU Council Regulation 2017/821 of 17 
May 2017 (EU Regulation 2017) (Note 25). Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Act defines “conflict minerals” as 
“any other mineral or its derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be financing the conflict in the DRC 
or an adjoining country”. The objective of section 1502 and EU Regulation 2017 is to cut the link between 
conflict and trade in minerals and drain revenues from armed groups. Section 1502 directed the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate regulations requiring a person who files reports with the SEC to 
disclose whether any conflict minerals originating from the DRC was in their product. This disclosure 
requirement applies to companies that file reports with SEC limiting the scope of the rules to report issuers. 
Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act aims to empower citizens in resource-rich countries to hold their 
governments accountable for wealth generated from natural resources in their States. Section 1504 expressly 
refers to EITI principles discussed above. The Dodd-Frank Act and the EU Regulation 2017 bristle with legal 
and practical problems. If the legislative intent of Congress was to reduce the use of conflict minerals thereby 
reducing the funding of armed groups, then the Congress used the wrong substantive law, namely, securities law 
to enforce reporting requirements that enhance transparency. The reporting requirement received a glancing blow 
in the decision of the US Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, in National Association of 
Manufacturers v SEC (Note 26). In this case, the Court held that the epithets “conflict free” or “not conflict free” 
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on websites of SEC filings conveyed a moral responsibility on companies where their businesses only indirectly 
finance armed groups in the DRC and was a compelled speech which violated the First Amendment’s right to 
companies’ free speech. In spite of this judgment, companies are still required to audit their supply chain and 
report to SEC where the minerals are sourced but they are not obliged to report that their sourced minerals are 
“conflict free” or “not conflict free”. And, what is more, most of the gold produced in the DRC is smuggled 
through neighbouring countries where they are smelted and sold to jewellers in the Middle East (Turner, 2013). 
4.4 Voluntary Regulation 
Voluntary regulation predates transparency laws. To facilitate exposition, one set of voluntary codes will suffice. 
The first voluntary codes of conduct, promulgated in 1976, are the Shell General Business Principles (Note 27). 
These codes are in three parts: (i) the core values of Shell such as honesty, integrity and respect for people; (ii) 
commitment to sustainable development: balancing short- and long- term interests and integrating economic, 
environmental and social considerations into business decision-making; and (iii) responsibilities to shareholders, 
customers, employees, business partners and society. From a corporate governance perspective, voluntary 
regulation may exacerbate the conflicts of interest between shareholders and stakeholders; from a legal 
perspective, it lacks effective enforcement mechanism and has been aptly described as “the fox guarding the hen 
house” (Baker, 1993). 
5. The (in)efficacy of the Mechanisms for Regulating TNCs 
The mechanisms for regulating TNCs are transparency laws, voluntary regulation and human rights litigation. 
The treaties, declarations and principles which govern corporate social responsibility are either binding as in the 
case of transparency laws such as KPCS, Dodd-Frank Act and the EU Regulation 2017 or non-binding as in the 
case of the OECD Principles, MNE Declaration and EITI and voluntary codes like the Shell Business Principles. 
Whether binding or not, the balance struck between imposing the whole corpus of international law on TNCs 
and doing nothing, that is, providing the least invasive mechanism for dealing with TNCs, leaves the civil 
population in developing countries in the hands of TNCs and they must depend on their goodwill for reparation. 
Abuse of human rights by TNCs is regarded as a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966 (ICCPR). In the US Courts violations of the ICCPR activate the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) as 
breaches of customary law. The ICCPR has been described as a ‘toothless tiger’ because the United States 
attached to its ratification five reservations, five understandings and one proviso (Carpenter, 2000). There are 
two formidable obstacles in invoking the jurisdiction of ATCA: the first is the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
and the second is the doctrine of judicial imperialism. In Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum (Note 28), discussed 
above, the doctrine of forum non conveniens was invoked to dismiss the case. 
In In Re Union Carbide Corp Gas Plant Disaster (Note 29), catastrophic damage was inflicted on a local 
population in a developing country. In this case, Union Carbide Corporation (Union Carbide), a New York firm 
owned 50.9 per cent of Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL). UCIL manufactured the pesticides Sevin and Temik at 
the Bhopal plant at the request of and with the approval of, the Government of India. On the night of December 
2–3, 1984 methyl isocyanate (MIC), a highly toxic gas, an ingredient in the production of both Sevin and Temik 
leaked from the plant for unascertained reasons and killed 2100 people (and it is still killing more people 36 
years on). Over 200,000 people suffered injuries – some serious and permanent and others mild. Over 145 
actions were filed in the United States District Court for the South District of New York involving approximately 
200,000 plaintiffs. Union Carbide, the defendants, filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated action on the 
grounds of forum non conveniens (that American court is not the appropriate forum). The plaintiffs and an 
amicus curiae argued that the Indian legal system was inadequate to handle Bhopal litigation because of the 
absence of a tort law in India relating to high technology or complex manufacturing processes; and, in any case, 
the public interest is served when United States Corporations assume responsibility for accidents on foreign soil 
and abandoning that responsibility would injure the US standing in the world community and betray the spirit of 
fairness in the American character. The Court concluded by stating that to retain the litigation in the forum (i.e., 
New York) would be another example of imperialism in which an established sovereign inflicts its rules, 
standards and values on a developing country and dismissed the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens. 
Union Carbide, in a settlement out of court, agreed to pay a final settlement of $470 million in 1989 to the Indian 
government which, campaigners argue, provided $500 each to 5000 victims and 570,000 exposed to the gas got 
nothing. In 1994, Union Carbide sold its subsidiary in India (UCIL) to a buyer who resold it to the India state of 
Madhya Pradesh. Union Carbide was then purchased by Dow Chemical Company in 2001 and the question of 
reparation became more complex. 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also intervene to curb abuses of market power by TNCs. NGOs have 
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mobilised public opinion against human rights abuses by TNCs but opinions are mixed on the efficacy of such 
interventions. Some national jurisdictions permit civil litigation and criminal trials by NGOs against corporations. 
The European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) founded in 2007 and based in Berlin and 
the Argentinian Centre for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) established in 1979 have turned their attention to 
corporate responsibility for international crimes (Grosecu, 2019). The problem is that there is not enough 
practice for this to amounts to jus cogens (Simma and Alston, 1988–1989). 
The right of indigenous peoples to their territories, resources and traditional knowledge is protected by Article 24 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 (ACHPR) (Note 30) and Article 11 of the San 
Salvador Protocol. Article 24 of the ACHPR protects the right to ‘a general satisfactory environment favourable 
to [the] development’ of the indigenous peoples as interpreted in SERAC v Nigeria above (Note 31). Article 11 
of the San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (Note 32) provides that everyone 
shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and State Parties shall promote the protection, preservation 
and improvement of the environment. These two instruments are complemented by Articles 24 and 25 of the 
United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007 (UNDRIP) (Note 33). Article 24 provides 
that indigenous peoples have an equal right to their traditional medicines, health practices and conservation of 
their vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals. Article 25 provides that indigenous peoples have the right to 
maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditional and otherwise occupied and 
used lands and territories. The problem is that although UNDRIP recognised the role played by NGOs as 
non-state actors, both traditional knowledge in particular and indigenous peoples’ rights in general are 
state-centred: only states are charged with the duties to secure the human rights. Although litigation on human 
rights abuses by TNCs are fraught with problems discussed in the Ogoniland cases and In Re Union Carbide 
above, the fact remains that the human rights approach, coupled with regional arrangements for the enforcement 
by the rights of indigenous peoples to their land, biogenetic resources and traditional knowledge, provides the 
best strategy for reconciling the rights of Agrobiotechnology TNCs with the rights of indigenous peoples as 
recognised in international instruments such as ACHPR and UNDRIP. 
Abuses of human rights, while serious, are not as heinous as crimes against humanity. The view of TNCs’ 
criminal liability for aiding and abetting crimes against humanity ought to be critically assessed. In the Farben 
case (Note 34), I.G. Farben, an Interessen Gemeinschaft (IG or community of interest) with a monopoly of 
German chemical production at the commencement of World War II played a leading role in Hitler’s war 
machine and could have been prosecuted before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg but was not. 
Of the 23 officers of the company charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity relating to the plundering 
and spoliation of foreign property and participation in slave labour programmes, 13 were convicted and 10 were 
acquitted. It has been suggested that the decision not to prosecute Farben as a juridical corporate entity was 
political, not legal. It is submitted that the reason is legal as neatly illustrated in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Company, 
discussed above (Note 35). In Kiobel, it was decided, inter alia, that international law did not recognise 
corporate liability for extrajudicial killings; crimes against humanity; torture and cruel treatment; arbitrary arrests 
and detentions; violations of the right to life, liberty, security and association; forced exile; and property 
destruction. But this case raises more questions than it answers. The pertinent questions are: (i) What is the status 
of corporations in international law? (ii) If international law addressed to corporate criminal liability were to be 
promulgated, where might criminal charges be brought? The traditional positivist theory of international law is 
that States are the only subjects of international law (Cassese, 2005; Crawford, 2019; and Salako, 2019). It is 
true that some jurisdictions such as the US and United Kingdom confer separate personality on corporations 
under criminal law but it is not “conclusive of autonomy vis-a-vis the state for the purpose of international law” 
(Note 36). National courts cannot try corporations for aiding and abetting crimes against humanity. This leads to 
the second question: If international law were addressed to corporate criminal liability, where might criminal 
charges be brought? There is a general consensus that the personal jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to natural 
persons (Crawford, 2019; Wouters et al., 2019). This is consonant with section 25(1) of the ICC Statute which 
provides that: “The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this statute.” However, it has 
been suggested that corporate criminal liability could be imposed by amending or tinkering with the jurisdiction 
of the ICC (Chiomenti, 2006). This suggestion bristles with evidentiary challenges on such matters as the 
ascription of the acts of the authors of the crime (natural persons) to corporations (artificial persons) (actus reus), 
the intent to commit the crime by the corporation (mens rea), legal causation or attribution, and refusal of 
economic actors (corporations) to provide information. We are left with the proffered international court with 
jurisdiction over corporations. 
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6. Conclusions 
TNCs’ exploitation of natural resources in developing countries is driven by their size and market power. The 
imperative for profit and neoliberalism put them in contact with acts of murder, torture, crimes against humanity 
and violations of human rights by rulers in developing countries exercising their resource sovereignty (Omeje, 
2008). Any conflict with the local community arising from the exploitation of natural resources is resolved by 
the mechanisms of human rights litigation, voluntary regulation (a public relations exercise) and transparency 
regulation. 
Human rights litigation is state-centred and limited by the doctrines of forum non conveniens and judicial 
imperialism which left the claimants in the Ogoniland cases to the goodwill of Royal Dutch Petroleum (Shell) 
and 570,000 claimants in In Re Union Carbide still without reparation 36 years after the ghastly accident. 
Neoliberalism not only triggers conflict as we saw in countries such as Chile, Bolivia, Bangladesh and the 
Philippines but also puts the control of businesses off-limits to popular deliberation and change. In spite of the 
trenchant critiques of the plethora of instruments promulgated on transparency laws, the neoliberal halfway 
house of non-invasive regulation is successful in dealing with “blood diamonds”. But the fact remains that there 
is still a rebuttable presumption that “conflict minerals”, and there are over 1100 of them, are often mined by 
artisanal miners and still being traded for profit by TNCs resulting in egregious human rights violations and 
crimes against humanity (Härkönen, 2018). 
The recurring theme in all the cases discussed above is the lack of (or meagre) reparation. The opportunity to 
hold a corporation liable for war crimes and crimes against humanity was missed in 1948 in the Farben case. 
What is required in the twenty-first century is the establishment of an international court with jurisdiction over 
corporations in the interests of restorative or reparative justice (Ashworth, 1993; Zedner, 1994). The idea was 
mooted by the African Union in a proposal for a criminal section of the African Court of Justice and People’s 
Rights, [a regional Court] (Jalal, Clarke and Nmehielle, 2019). This idea poses two conceptual problems which 
are surmountable. The first is whether retributive justice and reparative justice are antinomic, that is, whether 
they are claims which rival each other and whose goals must be in conflict (Zedner, 1994). It is submitted that 
they are not antinomic and in view of the Ogoniland cases and In Re Union Carbide, there is a need for 
paradigm shift in which “reparation” or “restoration” will take precedence over retribution; and this brings us to 
the second problem: what is the definition of a crime? The definition of a crime as “breaches of law as injure the 
community” is derived from the development of royal jurisdiction in England in the twelfth century which meant 
the direct restoration to the victim was sacrificed to securing the King’s peace. In other words, the wrong was 
against society (Kenny, 1929). In the late twentieth century, there was a movement towards restorative or 
reparative justice which saw crime not only as a crime against society but as a dispute between the offender (in 
this case, the TNCs) and the victims which required solution (Zehr, 1985; Wright, 1996). The establishment of an 
international court with jurisdiction (shorn of the doctrines of forum non conveniens and judicial imperialism) 
over corporations and power to award damages by way of reparation against TNCs, with vast financial resources, 
is the only just remedy for victims of TNCs’ illegal activities in the conflict regions. 
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